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After the human anthrax cases and exposures in 2001, the
Illinois Department of Public Health received an increasing
number of environmental and human samples (1,496 environ-
mental submissions, all negative for Bacillus anthracis). These
data demonstrate increased volume of submissions to a public
health laboratory resulting from fear of bioterrorism. 
A
fter the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
discovery of human anthrax cases and exposures several
weeks later on the East Coast, Illinois Department of Public
Health’s (IDPH) Division of Laboratories received environ-
mental and human samples for analysis as part of suspected
bioterrorism investigations. The large number of samples pro-
vided an opportunity to learn about the possible presence of
Bacillus anthracis in the environment, to gain insight into the
frequency of true versus perceived bioterrorist events, and to
observe and respond to the impact of widely publicized terror-
ism alerts. 
The Study
Submissions of powder and nonpowder environmental sam-
ples and human blood or tissue specimens submitted from
October 8 through December 31, 2001, were reviewed. Before
samples were accepted by IDPH Division of Laboratories, inci-
dents involving environmental samples had to be reviewed by
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agents who determined
if a potential bioterrorism threat was credible. The IDPH labo-
ratories in Chicago and Springfield processed all samples sub-
mitted through law enforcement authorities in this manner. The
Chicago laboratory received samples primarily from northern
Illinois (north of Interstate 80), while the Springfield laborato-
ry received samples from central and southern Illinois. The
Chicago laboratory followed all required guidelines for a
biosafety level 3 laboratory (1). 
The laboratory methods for identifying Bacillus species in
environmental samples have been reported elsewhere (2).
Laboratory methods included Gram stain and culture of suspi-
cious colonies grown on blood agar plates, and beta-lactamase,
motility, and gamma-phage lysis testing. A malachite green
stain for spores was performed on all powder specimens during
the initial 2 weeks at the Chicago laboratory and on selected
specimens thereafter; an M’Fadyean stain was used at the
Springfield laboratory. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was
performed on those samples requiring the most rapid turn-
around time (e.g., specimens submitted by a U.S. Postal
Service facility that had been closed pending results). Human
samples arrived from hospital laboratories in the form of a tryp-
tic soy agar slant and were plated to blood agar plates upon
arrival. Gamma-phage lysis, PCR, or both were performed as
needed. The Chicago and Springfield laboratories’ processed
their first samples on October 8 and October 9, respectively. 
Because no data were available regarding what to expect
from processing bioterrorism threat-related samples from the
environment, Bacillus organisms from most environmental and
human samples were speciated, even if negative for B.
anthracis.
Environmental Specimens
A total of 1,496 environmental specimens were processed:
1,193 (79.7%) in Chicago and 303 (20.3%) in Springfield. An
additional 40 human specimens were processed, 28 (70%) in
Chicago and 12 (30%) in Springfield. Chicago sample submis-
sions rose steadily after the first week of October and peaked
during the week of October 29 through November 4, with the
largest number of submissions processed on November 7
(range 0–64 submissions per day) (Figure). An additional 17
submissions for which the date of submission was not clearly
documented, and may have preceded October 8, also were
processed. Powdery substances constituted 42.0% of submis-
sions to the Chicago laboratory versus 33.7% of submissions to
the Springfield laboratory. Nonpowdery substances (e.g., envi-
ronmental swab samples, letters, envelopes, packages, and
other materials) constituted 58.0% of submissions to the
Chicago laboratory versus 66.3% of submissions to the
Springfield laboratory. Eight additional environmental samples
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Figure. Number of environmental specimens submitted to the Illinois
Department of Public Health Division of Laboratories for Bacillus
anthracis testing each week from October 8 through December 30,
2001 and number of human cases occurring on the East Coast and
reported each week in the news media. that did not go through the FBI were received by the Chicago
laboratory from hospitals.
Among both the powders and nonpowders processed at the
Chicago laboratory, the most frequently isolated organisms
were Bacillus cereus (19.2% and 8%, respectively) and non-
hemolytic staphylococci (23.9% and 22.8%, respectively)
(Table 1). Among the eight hospital samples not submitted
through the FBI, B. megaterium (four), B. thuringiensis (one),
and nonanthracis Bacillus species (three) were identified.
Twenty specimens (8 in Chicago and 12 in Springfield) were
processed by using PCR. All of these results were negative for
B. anthracis. 
Areview of the source and circumstances related to 57 non-
human samples submitted to the Chicago laboratory on
November 7, 2001 (the date with the highest number of sub-
missions), indicated that most of the items were mail items
(e.g., 18 letters or envelopes, 12 unspecified mail items, and 7
packages), but powders (7 submissions) and unspecified “sus-
picious substance” (13 items) also were identified. Such items
came from at least six counties and involved 13 local police
departments, the Illinois State Police, two fire departments, and
the FBI. In addition to submissions from private citizens, sub-
missions came from two universities, a post office, a private
business, and a consulate. A high level of anxiety among the
public was likely responsible for the otherwise unsuspicious
items submitted, including dairy creamer, powder from donuts,
a backpack, a telephone, a frozen dinner, a computer keyboard,
and a letter from a married man’s lover that was intercepted by
his wife and submitted unopened as a suspicious mail item. 
Human Specimens
Twenty-eight human specimens were submitted to the
Chicago state laboratory for evaluation after preliminary test-
ing at an initial laboratory (usually a hospital) could not rule
out B. anthracis (Table 2). These included 15 blood cultures.
For 12 specimens, the species were not identified, although test
results demonstrated they were not any of 16 Bacillus species.
An additional 12 specimens submitted to the Springfield labo-
ratory were negative for B. anthracis.
Conclusions
We found no samples positive for B. anthracis among the
nearly 1,500 submissions to IDPH for testing. Other state
health departments also received large numbers of submis-
sions: Michigan and Oklahoma received at least 228 and 762
submissions, respectively (3,4). These results demonstrate the
potential stress to a public health laboratory that may result
from bioterrorism-related anxiety and hyperalertness to the
environment.  This high state of alert by the public is important
for early recognition of a real bioterrorism event through
enhanced reporting. 
Our data demonstrate that the number of submissions was
temporally associated with the media attention to anthrax-relat-
ed events in Florida, New York City, Washington, D.C., and
other affected areas. Concern was reinforced with messages
from government, warning of the need for the public to be on
heightened alert for terrorism. On October 29, 2001, the U.S.
attorney general and the FBI director announced that U.S. citi-
zens and law enforcement agencies should be on “highest alert”
based on “credible” information, and police and citizens should
be “extremely vigilant.” Forty-five percent of the nearly 1,500
environmental specimens submitted to the state laboratory for
testing during the 12-week period arrived during the 2 weeks
after that announcement, which created an unprecedented
workload in bioterrorism evaluation. 
During the surge in laboratory demand, adequate numbers
of trained personnel to process the large volume of submissions
were needed. Additional staff were trained, and work hours
were expanded. Despite these efforts, a backlog occurred, caus-
ing specimens to be grouped in order of priority for rapid ver-
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Table 1. Results of 1,364 environmental specimens submitted to the Illinois Department of Public Health Division of Laboratories (Chicago 
laboratory) for Bacillus anthracis testing, October–December 2001 
Organism  Powder (%)  Nonpowder (%) 
Total  573 (42.0)  791 (58.0) 
B. cereus  110 (19.2)  63 (8.0) 
B. subtilis  29 (5.1)  32 (4.0) 
Other Bacillus species (hemolytic, positive motility)  21 (3.7)  40 
B. mycoides  16 (2.8)  6 
B. circulans  10 (1.7)  4 
B. pumilus  2 (0.3)  5 
B. brevis  1 (0.2)  1 
B. laterosporus  0  1 
B. megaterium  0  1 
B. polymyxa  0  1 
B. anthracis  0  0 
Staphylococcus species (nonhemolytic)  137 (23.9)  180 
Staphylococcus aureus  3 (0.5)  5 
Other mixed gram-positive organisms  48 (8.3)  68 
Gram-negative bacilli  80 (14.0)  72 
Enterobacter agglomerans  1 (0.2)  0 
Moraxella catarrhalis  1 (0.2)  0 
Mixed other gram-positive organisms and mold  8 (1.4)  11 
Mold  19 (3.3)  32 
No growth  87 (15.2)  269 Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 4, April 2003 505
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sus delayed processing. Delay in processing added to the anxi-
ety experienced by many who submitted samples. Laboratory
staff were distracted by frequent requests for updated informa-
tion. Because of evolving information, emerging guidance
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the
difficulty of managing staff who were being pulled away from
other laboratory jobs to assist with bioterrorism samples, meet-
ings were held frequently (often more than once per day).
However, such meetings also competed with laboratory time,
which was needed to process the increasing load of submis-
sions.
Among the more positive aspects of the high volume of sub-
missions was enhanced cooperation with law enforcement offi-
cials, especially the FBI. Such officials maintained a temporary
office in the Chicago laboratory facility, where submissions
could be received at all hours, prioritized, and then delivered
individually or batched for submission to the laboratory (which
did not have a night shift of workers) during working hours.
Because health department laboratories have previously had
only limited and sporadic experience with the test methods
involved in urgent microbiologic evaluation for anthrax, the
experience with these submissions provided an opportunity to
polish critical laboratory skills, to utilize infrequently used or
not previously available equipment (e.g., real time PCR), to
speciate nonanthracis Bacillus isolates to determine what
species may be expected during such an event, and to anticipate
what personnel and changes in protocols might be needed dur-
ing future bioterrorist events. This experience also highlighted
the importance of regular training and updating of laboratory
staff on procedures relevant to bioterrorism agent evaluation. 
We recommend continued close communication and collab-
oration between public health and law enforcement officials,
which include developing flexible criteria on specimen submis-
sion guidelines for public laboratories. Development of stan-
dardized forms for information collection related to suspicious
substance submissions may be useful in evaluating the epi-
demiology of any future bioterrorism events. We also recom-
mend regular training of laboratory staff on procedures relevant
to bioterrorism agent evaluation, including cross-training of
selected staff not usually involved in the handling of suspected
bioterrorism agents as part of a surge capacity plan. Such a plan
should also include a mechanism for handling submissions
after regular work hours because of the high profile and expec-
tations of turnaround time that submissions for bioterrorism
agent evaluation usually have. Finally, enhancing communica-
tion between the many agencies involved remains both a chal-
lenge and an opportunity for future efforts to combat these
kinds of events. 
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Table 2. Results of 28 human specimens submitted to the Illinois Department of Public Health Division of Laboratories (Chicago laboratory) for 
Bacillus anthracis testing, October–December 2001
a 
Organism  No. (%)  Source (no.) 
B. cereus  5 (17.9)  Blood (3), nasal (2) 
B. megaterium  4 (14.3)  Blood (2), leg wound (1), abdominal fluid (1) 
B. subtilis  2 (7.1)  Blood (2) 
B. brevis  1 (3.6)  Wound (1) 
B. coagulans  1 (3.6)  Blood (1) 
B. firmus  1 (3.6)  Blood (1) 
B. pumulus  1 (3.6)  Blood (1) 
Paenibacillus macerans  1 (3.6)  Unspecified 
Bacillus species, other (not speciated)  12 (42.9)  Blood (8), nasal (1), body fluid (1), cerebrospinal fluid (1), unspecified (1) 
B. anthracis  —  — 
aAfter preliminary testing at an Illinois laboratory could not rule out B. anthracis. 
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